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Concert tickets can either be sold at a single price or at multiple prices corresponding
to di⁄erent seating categories. We study the relationship between price discrimination
and revenue by examining variations in the number of seating categories across concert,
tour, artist, location, and time. O⁄ering multiple seating categories leads to revenues that
are approximately 5 percent higher than with single price ticketing. The return to price
discrimination is higher in markets with more heterogeneous demand, in smaller venues
and in more competitive markets. The return of increasing from three to four categories of
seating is about half that of increasing from one to two.
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Although price discrimination is widely discussed in the economic literature, much less 
has been published in the way of empirical evidence documenting its impact on revenues. 
Some headway in filling this gap has been made in recent years, with studies focusing on 
single firms (Leslie, 2004) and single markets (McManus, 2008).  Here we report the first 
systematic evidence of a relationship between price discrimination and revenue, based on 
analysis of a rich panel dataset of pop music concerts covering a large share of the US 
concert industry over multiple years.   
We make two contributions.  First, we estimate the impact of price discrimination on 
revenue.  Second, we document how this impact depends on product, seller, and market 
characteristics, factors that have been shown to matter in the theoretical literature (Stole, 
2007, and Rosen and Rosenfield, 1997).  For example, we show that the return to price 
discrimination is higher in markets that are more heterogeneous in term of occupational 
diversity, income inequality, or ethnical heterogeneity.  
Concerts for popular music offer a unique environment for the study of price 
discrimination, first of all because concert pricing provides a textbook application. The 
practice of selling tickets for different seats at the same venue at widely disparate prices 
can be unambiguously attributed to price discrimination: the seating capacity and the 
distribution of seat quality are givens, and the only issue is whether to sell different seats at 
the same or at different prices.  In contrast, most studies in the literature present cases 
where price differences among products may be the result of variations in marginal cost, 
rather than of price discrimination (Shepard (1991), Clerides (2004)).  Another advantage 
of studying the concert industry is that its pricing policies are relatively straightforward.   2
For each venue, a pricing policy divides the venue into categories, and establishes a price 
for each.   
Our dataset covers over 21,000 concerts by the top 100 grossing artists in the concert 
industry over the period 1992-2005.
1  For each concert in our sample, we have access to 
information not only on pricing policies, as have past non-structural studies of price 
discrimination (e.g. Shepard 1991, Nevo and Wolfram 2002, Busse and Rysman, 2004), 
but also on revenue. We can thus investigate how the former influences the latter.  Finally, 
we also collected information on the characteristics of the product (venue, genre of music, 
type of tour), of the vendor (information about the artist and band ), and of demand 
(features of the local population).  
A concert may offer all seats at the same price (single-price ticketing), or split seats in 
two or more seating categories, each with its own price.  In the core of this work, we say 
that a concert uses price discrimination if there are two or more seating categories.  We 
compute the effect of using price discrimination on revenue.  After controlling for artist, 
city, and year fixed effects, we find that price discrimination is associated to about 5 
percent greater revenues. This preliminary finding is open to diverse interpretations. Above 
all, our estimate may reflect both a selection effect and the causal effect of price 
discrimination on revenue. Our baseline results, however, do control for market fixed 
effects (city dummies), product fixed effect (artist), and year fixed effects.  Still, other 
sources of unobserved heterogeneity may be correlated with the decision to price 
discriminate, thus confounding the interpretation of the baseline finding.  
We pursue three empirical strategies to investigate whether the relationship we identify 
is causal.  First, we follow the same approach as Nevo and Wolfram (2002) and control for 
unobserved heterogeneity by exploiting the rich nature of our panel.  The robustness of the   3
baseline results with a restricted set of fixed effects, to a wide set of richer specifications 
with interacted fixed effects and additional control variables, suggests that taking a 
difference in difference in difference (product, location, time) is sufficient to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity.  
Second, we pursue an instrumental variable approach that combines the insight of Nevo 
and Wolfram (2002), who propose exploiting the regional average propensity to use price 
discrimination, with the information that we have on the identity of each concert’s 
promoter.  The instrumental variable we use is the promoter-city-year propensity to price 
discriminate, measured as a city-year average (excluding the concert being instrumented).  
Promoters have expertise that vary from city to city and year to year due to manager 
turnover, learning, and change in local environment. Since artists typically use the same 
promoter for different cities in the same tour, this variation across cities in the promoter’s 
experience is correlated with the use of price discrimination, but not with remaining 
unobserved heterogeneity.  Our estimates do not change when we instrument price 
discrimination.  
Another approach to establishing causality is to examine the theoretical mechanism 
through which price discrimination might influence revenue.  This provides a completely 
new way of looking at the evidence.  We no longer attempt to measure the average impact 
of price discrimination on revenue, as in the previous two approaches.  Rather, we study 
how this relation depends on demand and product characteristics.  Building upon Rosen 
and Rosenfield’s (1997) model of ticket pricing, we demonstrate that the return to price 
discrimination should decrease with venue size but increase with the income of the local 
population and with a less homogeneous population of consumers.  These specific 
predictions made by the theory can be tested. This approach has two advantages. First, it 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1 If we increased the sample to include the top 500 grossing artists over the same   4
allows us to seek evidence of a specific causal mechanism of price discrimination on 
revenues. Second, as we only use variability in revenues across concerts that do use price 
discrimination, we can disregard issues related to the possibility that the decision to price 
discriminate is correlated with unobserved characteristics.   
As predicted, we find that the return to price discrimination is higher in markets where 
the local public is more heterogeneous and this holds when we consider heterogeneity in 
age, occupation, or ethnicity.  We also find that the return to price discrimination increases 
with income and decreases with venue capacity.  The consistency of this third set of results 
with standard economic theory further corroborates our interpretation of the initial results.  
These results diverge from those of previous empirical studies, which have rejected the 
theoretical predictions of monopoly models of price discrimination (Verboven (1999) and 
Nevo and Wolfram (2002)).
2 
After establishing these results, we investigate two issues of interest for policy-makers 
and industrial economists.  First, we consider the role of competition, measured by the 
average frequency of concerts offered each year in a given city.  We find that competition 
does not influence the level of revenue but increases the return to price discrimination.  
This result is inconsistent with models of price discrimination and competition (e.g., see 
Stole (2007) for a review), but it could also be explained by the greater amount of 
information available on how to segment a venue in more competitive markets. Our 
findings also complement the empirical work of Verboven (1996) and Busse and Rysman 
(2005).  Both studies show that the extent of price discrimination increases with market 
competition.  In contrast, we consider the interacted impact of price discrimination and 
competition on revenue. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
period, for example, the top 100 artists would represent 70 percent of total revenue.  
2 A candidate explanation is that these past studies considered oligopolistic industries, 
whereas our application more closely matches the standard case of monopoly pricing.   5
Second, we tackle the question of how revenue changes when the number of product 
categories increases.  We distinguish the impact of offering 2, 3, and 4 product categories 
and show that the marginal impact of adding categories is decreasing with the number of 
seating categories made available.  These results fit in with the literature on the returns to 
complex product portfolios (Wilson 1993, Miravete 2007).   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  We briefly summarize the relevant 
literature. We then offer some brief information about the concert industry and present the 
data, outlining why and how sellers split venues into different seating sections.  Section 3 
introduces the econometric framework and discusses the issue of causality in the 
interpretation of the relationship between price discrimination and revenue.  Section 4 
presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.  
 
Literature 
Our evidence contributes to previous non-structural studies of price discrimination 
(Shepard (1991), Nevo and Wolfram (2002), Busse and Rysman (2005)). As mentioned 
earlier, one issue that has received much attention is whether the practice of selling similar 
goods at different prices (price differentiation) is due to price discrimination or to marginal 
cost pricing.  In contrast, this paper selects an industry where price differentiation is 
unambiguously due to price discrimination and then investigates the relationship between 
price discrimination and revenue. 
This study complements the evidence from structural micro econometrics (Leslie 2004, 
Miravete and Röller 2004, McManus, 2008).  In contrast with most structural studies, 
however, our evidence is based on an entire industry.  It is most closely related to Leslie, 
and the magnitude of our estimates is consistent with the results presented in his 
simulations.  There are important differences, however.  The two studies adopt very   6
different methodologies that leverage different sources of variations in pricing policies.  
We compare events with and without price discrimination, which is not possible in Leslie’s 
analysis because the seller always uses two or three seating categories.  Instead, Leslie first 
estimates a demand system (leveraging variations over time in the level of price and in the 
allocation of seats to categories) and then simulates the return to price discrimination.  In 
addition, we can measure how market characteristics influence the return to price 
discrimination using variability across a large number of markets. 
Our work also contributes to the empirical literature of cultural economics (Krueger 
(2005) and Huntington (1993)) and to the theoretical literature on ticket pricing (Rosen and 
Rosenfield (1997) and Courty (2003)).    
 
2- Concert Tour Industry: Data, Definitions, and Stylized Facts  
The modern touring industry was born in the late 1960s when a few bands such as the 
Rolling Stones and Led Zeppelin regularly started to tour a variety of arenas and stadiums, 
using their own experienced crew to take care of the sound, staging and lighting.  In the 
1980s, advances in technology allowed bands to offer even more ambitious stage shows 
that were louder and brighter, and available to ever-larger audiences.  By 2007, the North 
American concert industry had grown to $4 billion in revenue and 100 million in 
attendance.
3 
Most of the concerts in our sample (19,540 concerts out of 21,120) were given as part of 
a tour.  In brief, a concert tour is typically organized by an artist represented by his or her 
manager, a (booking) agent, and a promoter.  The artist and the agent agree on an act and a 
tour plan.  The agent then looks for promoters to organize the event in each city.  The artist 
                                                            
3 The information on the touring industry presented in this section was collected by 
interviewing concert promoters as well as two professors who teach courses on   7
comes to an agreement with each promoter on a pricing policy and on a revenue sharing 
rule.  Promoters are in charge of organizing the events, and this involves booking venues, 
advertising, and collecting revenues.  Our data identifies the main parties involved in 
organizing a concert (artists, venue, and promoter), with the exception of the agent, whose 
role is limited to putting artists and promoters in touch. 
There are some variations on the theme.  Most artists use the same set of promoters to be 
in charge of the tour but some also add local promoters in some cities to tap into the local 
expertise so crucial for success. On average, the largest promoter within a tour organizes 
46 percent of the concerts, while the largest two organize 59 percent. In 25 percent of the 
tours, the largest two promoters are involved in pricing more than 92 percent of the 
concerts.  A few artists do everything in-house and directly contact the venues.  Although 
there are different types of tours (e.g., promotional tours of new releases, seasonal tours, 
festival tours), all of the concerts in a single tour usually include a common set of songs 
and similar stage, and are marketed together.   
 
Pricing and promoter knowledge  
Each event is unique and there is no set formula for pricing a concert.  Ticket prices are 
typically determined when the tour is announced and remain unchanged.
4  As a 
consequence, there is no second chance if one gets the wrong number of seating categories 
or prices.  Artists and promoters vary in their ability and/or willingness to design complex 
pricing policies.   
Promoter experience with price discrimination varies across local markets.  We 
elaborate on this point because it plays a key role in motivating our choice of instrumental 
                                                                                                                                                                      
concert promotion. Some of the information was also drawn from recent books and 
industry manuals on concert promotion, in particular Waddell et al. (2007).     
4 Promoters may add or cancel events, but rarely change prices or category allocation.     8
variable. Waddell et al. (2007) reports that “the art of concert promotion is derived from 
the experience, instinct, knowledge of the event to promote and who it appeals to, innate 
sense of timing, and flair necessary to capture public awareness” (p. 193) and comment in 
detail on the role of local information: “we work with each promoter and try to tap into 
their vast knowledge of their local market to make the right call on when to put a show on-
sale, ticket scaling options and when you roll into multiple shows” (p. 47).  The first quote 
implies that pricing solutions may be idiosyncratic and promoter specific, while the second 
refers specifically to the number of seating categories (scaling) and emphasizes the role of 
the promoter’s market-specific knowledge.  Pricing policies are event and promoter 
specific, which implies that some of the policy variations in our sample may be a result of 




This study focuses on the primary market for concert tickets, with data from two sets of 
sources.  The core of the data was collected by Billboard and contains variables similar to 
those used by Connolly and Krueger (2006).  For each concert defined by a date, venue, 
and artist(s), we observe the promoter in charge, the different prices offered, the capacity 
available, and the attendance and revenue realized.  Table 1 presents summary statistics for 
the main variables.  In addition, we collected tour dates from band and fan websites and 
information regarding the bands from music websites, artist websites, and the Rolling 
Stone Encyclopedia of Rock and Roll.   
                                                            
5 In fact, Waddell et al. (2007, p. 199) even report that experimentation and innovation 
influence the decision as whether to use price discrimination: “every once in a while 
you’ll have a clever promoter in another market that comes up with an interesting idea 
you never thought of, and if it works in one place it might work in another. The agent 
giving you that kind of information is terrific.”   9
Our resulting panel data is thus three dimensional.  The first dimension describes the 
product, i.e., a concert, and can be aggregated by music genre, artist, or tour.  The second 
dimension describes the local demand and can be aggregated at the level of city or state.
6  
In addition, knowledge of the venue in which the concert takes place provides information 
about both product and demand characteristics. The third dimension is time.   
There are several differences from the Connolly and Krueger (2006) dataset.  In terms of 
breadth, we focus on the top 100 grossing artists over the period 1992-2005, which 
represents the majority of the industry (see footnote 3).  In terms of depth, our data is 
richer in several dimensions.  First, we observe all of the prices for each concert, rather 
than just the highest and lowest prices.  Second, we know whether a concert is part of a 
tour and, if so, what type of tour.  This additional information allows us to provide a much 
more complete picture of the pricing strategies across seating categories at the tour level. 
 
2-2 Definitions, Stylized Facts, and Sources of Variation in Price Discrimination 
In our sample, 56 percent of the concerts offer two price categories, 25 percent one, 15 
percent three, and the remaining 4 percent four categories. We say that a seller price 
discriminates if tickets for different seats are offered at multiple prices. This definition of 
price discrimination distinguishes between unsophisticated pricing (general admission) and 
sophisticated pricing (differentiated seating).  While the core of this paper focuses on this 
broad distinction, Section 4.6 computes the return to each additional pricing category.  
Beyond these distinctions, we do not attempt to measure the intensity of price 
discrimination (Clerides, 2004).
7 
                                                            
6 We also collected data on local market characteristics from the 2000 Census. We match our dataset 
on concerts with census data at the city or place level. 
7 For example, two pricing policies with the same number of categories and the same 
prices are equally classified as discriminating according to our definition, although 
they may allocate different proportions of seats to each category.   10
Figure 1, 2, and 3 plot the fraction of concerts that use price discrimination for the cities, 
artists, and promoters with the largest number of concerts in our sample.  These plots point 
out important sources of heterogeneity. Price discrimination varies greatly across cities, 
artists, and promoters. There is a general trend toward greater use of price discrimination 
(Connolly and Krueger, 2006).
8 But there are also many variations on this trend, as well as 
notable exceptions.
9   
A linear probability model explaining the existence of price discrimination with artist, 
year, and city fixed effects accounts for 52 percent of the variability in the use of price 
discrimination.
10  This figure is consistent with the hypothesis that the choice to price 
discriminate depends on product and demand characteristics, but it also indicates that about 
half of the variations in the use of price discrimination cannot be explained by these fixed 
effects.  Even if we only consider the concerts by a single artist in a given year, there is 
still significant variability in the use of price discrimination. Only 27 percent of the 846 
artist-year combinations with more than two concerts consistently used price 
discrimination, or never used price discrimination, but never did both.  Similarly, we find 
significant heterogeneity in the use of price discrimination when we restrict the sample to 
artists performing repeatedly in the same city, artists repeatedly hiring the same promoter, 
                                                            
8  In our sample, price discrimination roughly doubled from less than 50 percent to 90 
percent from 1992 to 2005, but this figure is partly due to the age composition of the 
sample (young artists are over-represented late in the sample and all artists get older 
throughout the sample) and the fact that the artist life cycle influences the use of price 
discrimination (Courty and Pagliero, 2008).  
9 6 of the 112 cities with more than one concert both in 1992 and 2005 experienced no 
increase in the frequency of price discrimination. For artists, the figures are 3 out of 
28 and for promoters 2 out of 18. 
10 Using finer controls (replacing artist fixed effects by tour effects, and cities by 
venues) increases the percentage of variations explained by only 4 percent.   11
concerts within the same city and year, and promoters organizing concerts in the same 
year, city and city-year combinations.
11   
We conclude that there are variations in the use of price discrimination even after we 
control for time, artist, city or promoter fixed effects, or when we focus on variations 
within sub-cells of artist-year, artist-city, artist-promoter, or city-year.  Unexplained 
variability in price discrimination may be due to variability in artists’ willingness to 
experiment with new pricing policies or attitudes toward price discrimination, 
heterogeneity in promoter experience, access to updated local market information, as well 
as to turnover within promotion firms or implementation constraints preventing the use of 
price discrimination. The next section explains how different sources of variation are used 
to estimate the impact of price discrimination on revenue.  
 
3-Empirical Framework and Interpretation  
Our empirical objective is to estimate the impact of price discrimination on revenue.  
This estimation problem falls within treatment effect literature once one labels the concerts 
that use price discrimination as the treated ones (Wooldridge, 2002, Chapter 18). One 
would ideally want to randomly manipulate treatment and then measure the impact of 
doing so on revenue. In the absence of such ideal conditions, one may leverage the fact that 
the use of price discrimination varies for exogenous reasons.  We estimate variants of the 
following general model, 
ln(Ri) = γ0  +Xiγ1+ PDi [γ2 +Yiγ3] + Φ
1
iγ4+ εi            (1) 
                                                            
11 Of the 2,190 pairs of artist and promoters that organized at least two concerts in the 
sample, only 62 percent either always used price discrimination or never used it at all.  
The corresponding figure is 70 percent for the 4,831 combinations of artist and city in 
which an artist performed at least twice, 37 percent for the 2,570 city-year 
combinations, and 36 percent for the 775 promoter-year combination, 50 percent of 
the 2,066 promoter-city combinations and 58 percent of the 3,143 promoter-city-year 
combinations with at least two concerts.    12
where ln(Ri) is the log of revenue in concert i; γ0 is a constant; Xi is a vector of concert 
characteristics, such as venue capacity and number of artists performing, affecting 
revenues for concert i; PDi is an indicator variable that is equal to one if more than one 
price category is offered but otherwise zero; Yi is a vector of concert and local market 
characteristics, affecting the return to price discrimination (a full list of the variables 
included in Xi and Yi is presented in Table 7). Φ
1
i is a vector of indicator variables that 
could include artist or tour, city or venue, promoter, and year dummies and also 
interactions between them;  γ0 and γ2 are scalars, γ1, γ3 and γ4 are vectors of parameters, and 
εi is an error term that could capture, for example, demand shocks that are realized after 
prices are set.  We can estimate the return to price discrimination under the assumption that 
E(ε|X,Y,PD,Φ
1)=0. If this is the case, the OLS estimate of  γ2 is the average treatment 
effect (the average return to price discrimination) if there are no variables in Y. Otherwise, 
the average treatment effect is γ2 +Y*iγ3, where Y* includes the sample mean of the 
variables in Y, and the vector γ3 is the marginal return of the variables in Y.  
 
Selection to treatment 
To determine whether the assumption E(ε|X,Y,PD,Φ
1 )=0 holds, one needs to 
understand what determines treatment.  Artist and promoter use price discrimination if 
doing so increases profits.  We focus on a simple treatment rule that illustrates the sources 
of identification that can be exploited with our data,  


 Φ = > Φ − Φ = Φ
=
otherwise
Y X PD R Y X C Y X PD R Y X I if
PD
0
) , , , 0 ( )] , , ( )    , , , 1 ( )[ , , ( 1
1 2 1 2
     (2) 
R(PD=x,.) is the revenue if PD=x∈{0,1}. Φ
2 is a matrix of dummy variables that could be 
different from Φ
1. I is an indicator variable that is equals to one if the promoter knows how 
to implement price discrimination (how to split the venue and set prices). We introduce I   13
because promoter experience is key to the success of price discrimination.  The artist can 
earn the price discrimination revenue R(PD=1) only if I=1. C is the cost of implementing 
price discrimination and it depends on the match between the stage used in a given tour 
and the venue where the concert takes place. C may also capture other cost shifters such as 
variations in distribution channels, and local regulatory constraints that differentially apply 
to different types of music.  
 
Selection on Observable Variables 
For the sake of exposition, we ignore for now the interaction variables (Y=∅). The 
condition E(ε|X,PD,Φ
1)=0 can be defended on several grounds. It holds if some dummy 
variables enter the selection equation in Φ
2 (generating variations in PD) but not the 
revenue equation in Φ
1 (so that there exist some exogenous variability in PD).  Two sets of 
interacted fixed effects may satisfy these conditions. Consider first variations in C due to 
venue-tour interactions. The artist commits to a stage design for an entire tour (this 
includes overall stage setting, lights, special effects, number of players in the band). The 
artist faces a different cost of implementing price discrimination in each venue that 
depends on the match between the stage design and venue characteristics, distribution of 
seats, and security constraints. On the other hand, there is no reason for why the venue-tour 
interaction should belong to Φ
1.   
A similar argument can be made that promoter-city fixed effects enter (2) through I but 
not (1). There is typically one main promoter for each tour. This promoter, however, has 
local experience that varies from city to city (the promoter-city dummies belongs to Φ
2). 
But artists choose promoters on the basis of how well they match the entire tour, that is, on 
their ability to raise the average level of revenue across all cities.  Thus, the promoter-city   14
dummy does not belong to Φ
1 under the assumption that local experience influences 
revenue only through the price discrimination decision.  
For the assumption E(ε|X,PD,Φ
1 )=0 to be violated, it must be the case that the decision 
to price discriminate is correlated with some unobserved variable that affects concert 
revenue.  But Φ
1γ4 can account for a large set of fixed effects and interacted fixed effects 
that allow for many sources of unobserved heterogeneity and very general selection rules.  
Tour fixed effects allows for different tours attracting different publics.  It also controls for 
artist fixed effects because the vast majority of tours in our sample include a single artist.  
Venue fixed effects controls for venue heterogeneity (physical constraints, location).  In 
addition, we can include interacted fixed effects that control for the possibilities that 
different artists face different fan populations in different cities, that their typical fan varies 
from year to year, that the fan population in a given city varies over time, and that some 
promoters may have a different impact on revenue depending on the artist.  
E(ε|X,PD,Φ
1)=0 could be violated if the return to price discrimination varies across 
concerts and the artist chooses to price discriminate when the return to price discrimination 
is high. In this case, however, the estimate of the average treatment effect in model (1)  
only needs to be reinterpreted as the average treatment effect on the treated (Heckman and 
Robb, 1985).
12 To our knowledge, there is no other compelling economic argument for 
why E(ε|X,PD,Φ
1)=0 should be violated.  There still remains the possibility that, for 
reasons that are not economic, selection takes place on unobservable variables that are 
                                                            
12 Assume the treatment effect has an independent random component α (e.g. concert-
specific feature of local demand) that is observed by the seller but not by the 
econometrician, so that  γ’2= γ2+α, and the seller chooses whether to price discriminate on 
the basis of this information.  When the return to price discrimination is random, 
estimating model (1) by OLS provides the average treatment effect on the treated 
 γ’2= γ2+E(αi|PD=1), while the IV estimate gives the average treatment effect  γ2 
(Heckman and Robb, 1985).  In our application, the two estimates give similar values 
suggesting that the random component α is not important.   15
correlated with the random component of revenue. An instrumental variable approach 
takes care of this possibility. 
 
Instrumental Variable 
Equation (2) suggests using as an instrument a variable correlated with I or C but not 
with ε.  While variations in C are purely idiosyncratic (concert specific), I varies at the city 
level for each promoter.  We propose to use as a proxy for I the promoter’s propensity to 
use price discrimination for all the other concerts that took place in the same city and year 
as concert i.  Formally, let P
j
i=1 if concert j≠i takes place in the same city and year as 
concert i and has the same promoter as concert i and P
j
i=0 otherwise.  We use as 




The economic rationale for this IV is based on the argument made earlier that identification 
can be obtained from variations in I.  Such variations in I are exogenous if promoters are 
chosen to match an entire tour but their local price discrimination experience varies from 
city to city and year to year due to differences in management style, or staff turnover at the 
city level.
13 Formally, this is a valid instrument under three conditions.  First, Z is 
correlated with PD which is the case because all concerts organized by a given promoter in 
the same city-year share the same local experience Z.  If local experience matters, we 
would expect that dPD/dZ>0, a condition that can be tested in the first stage regression. 
Second, Z is excluded from the structural model determining revenues (1). This is true if, 
holding promoter identity constant, local price discrimination experience influences 
concert revenue only through the use of price discrimination. Third, E(ε|X,Φ
1,Z)=0, and a 
                                                            
13 We also consider the same IV but at the promoter-city level, and the results are 
robust. Our IV approach is similar to Nevo and Wolfram (2002) but richer since we 
also use information on promoter identity.   16
sufficient condition for this to be the case is that the concert-specific shocks εi are 
independent across concerts within a given city and year.   
According to the selection equation, we could in theory have used as instruments a set 
of dummies for each promoter-city interaction. The exclusion condition for Z is weaker 
than that for this alternative set of IVs. Although it is plausible that the promoter-city 
dummies could enter the revenue equation even after having controlled for promoter and 
city fixed effects, local price discrimination experience is much more finely defined and it 
is not unreasonable to assume that is not correlated with other skills (of the local promoter) 
that also influence revenues. 
 
Interaction Effects 
If the unobserved demand and supply characteristics affecting revenues through the 
error term are uncorrelated with our control variables, E(εΦ
1,PD,X,Y)=0, then the average 
treatment effect is  [γ2 +Y*iγ3]. Even if the above condition does not hold, we can still 
obtain an unbiased estimate of the vector γ3, which measures the impact of variables in Y 
on the return to price discrimination,  as long as E(εΦ
1,PD=1,X,Y)=0. Studying the sign 
and magnitude of the coefficients in γ3 is interesting per se, because one can test theoretical 
predictions on how the variables Yi should influence the return to price discrimination (for 
the treated group).  Doing so, we use only variability in revenues across concerts that do 
use price discrimination.  The validity of this approach rests on the economic foundations 
of the mechanisms that justifies that the return to price discrimination should depend on the 
variables in Y.   
According to monopoly theory, the gain to price discrimination depends on the 
distribution of consumer preferences and the marginal cost function.  Matters are simpler 
in our case study, because marginal costs are zero, and even more importantly, physical   17
constraints dictate the quantity of seats that can be allocated to each category. Rosen and 
Rosenfield (1997) propose a simple model of ticket pricing and derive general predictions 
on how the return to price discrimination depends on market primitives. They assume that 
the venue can be split into ns seats of quality s, s=l,h.  There are two types of consumers. 
Consumer θ=L,H values v
θ

















l. There are not enough high types to fill the entire venue but there are enough high 
types to fill the high quality seats (this is a reasonable assumption in the concert industry).  
Under price discrimination, the monopolist fully extracts the surplus of the low type 



















Since the first term above corresponds to the revenue under uniform pricing 
R(PD=0)=[nl+nh]v
L







l]  (3) 
depends on the fraction of high quality seats and on the variability in preferences in the 
population.  We set out to test whether demand and supply characteristics that influence 
these two terms have the predicted sign on the estimated return to price discrimination. 
 
4-Results 
The results are presented as follows.  Table 2 restricts γ3=0 and includes no interacted 
fixed effects.  The aim is to estimate the average (across the top 100 artists) impact of price 
discrimination on revenue.  Table 3 reports the results including interacted fixed effects for 
artist-year, artist-city, city-year and artist-promoter. This demonstrates the stability of our   18
initial results after controlling for a wide variety of unobserved heterogeneity.  Tables 4-6 
present the IV regression results.  Table 7 reports the estimates of interaction effects γ3.  
 
4-1 Impact of Price Discrimination on Revenue 
The first row of Table 2 reports the average increase in revenues associated with the use 
of more than one pricing category. Each column corresponds to a different specification: 
column 1 reports the results without control variables, column 2 controls for capacity, and 
columns 3 adds artist, city and year fixed effects.  Controlling for capacity reduces the 
impact of price discrimination by half.  The reason is that revenue is higher in larger 
venues, and larger venues are more likely to use price discrimination because 
heterogeneity in seating experience increases with size.  Adding artist, city, and year fixed 
effects further reduces the impact of price discrimination.  Again, the use of price 
discrimination is correlated with time trend,  artist popularity, and city demand.
14   
We compare the results of the fixed effect estimator in column 3 with the corresponding 
random effect estimator (Hausman test).  Since we reject the null of no change in the 
parameters of the remaining control variables, we can deduce that the fixed effects capture 
relevant unobserved heterogeneity.  In fact, the return to price discrimination is 
significantly higher (24 percent) when we do not include any fixed effects than when we 
do (5 percent).     
In column 4, we replace the artist fixed effects with tour fixed effects and the city fixed 
effects with venue fixed effects. This is a richer specification, since, on average, each artist 
is observed in more than 6 tours in the sample (and very few tours have multiple artists). 
                                                            
14 When we add only year fixed effects in addition to capacity, the impact is 9 percent 
(not reported).  This sharp decrease could be explained by the simultaneous increase 
in revenue and use of price discrimination during our sample period as documented 
by Krueger (2005) but this figure over-estimates the role of time because age   19
The tour fixed effects capture common features of the event (e.g., stage and  songs). Venue 
fixed effects not only control for the city-specific demographics but also for venue-specific 
characteristics, such as location, type (theater or stadium) and overall experience. In 
column 5, we further add a series of promoter fixed effects, capturing the time invariant 
characteristics of the main promoter for each concert. This is important because the 
promoter can influence the pricing and marketing of a concert.
15 The impact of price 
discrimination is positive and significantly different from zero at conventional levels. The 
magnitude is also economically significant: revenues are 5 percent higher when more than 
one price is used, and for the average concert in 2005, this amounts to over $37,000. In 
2005 alone, price discrimination accounts for over $50 million for the top 100 artists.  
Interestingly, the coefficient estimates in Table 2 are stable across the last 3 columns, 
suggesting that the finer controls in column 4 and 5 do not reveal further sources of 
unobserved heterogeneity relative to the simple model with artists, city and year fixed 
effects in column 3.
16  In the next section, we show that this is also the case when we allow 
for more general sources of unobserved heterogeneity.   
 
4-2 Controlling for Interacted Fixed Effects 
                                                                                                                                                                      
increases over the sample period and older artists earn more and are more likely to 
price discriminate.   
15 The results are robust when we also add log-capacity squared to capture further non-
linear capacity effects. 
16 We also tested for the existence of unobserved heterogeneity for some of the 
additional fixed effects included in Table 2 and 3.  For example, we compared column 
5 in Table 2, with the results of the specification column 4 with the addition of 
random promoter fixed effects, and rejected the equality of the coefficients common 
to both specifications.  We cannot rule out the existence of promoter unobserved 
heterogeneity,,but such unobserved heterogeneity does not affect the economic 
magnitude of the estimate of the return to price discrimination.  Because unobserved 
heterogeneity could matter, we consider specifications with interacted fixed effects in 
the next subsection and we also include a large subset of fixed effects in Section 4-4.     20
We leverage the feature of our dataset that the use of price discrimination varies within 
sub-cells of artist-year, artist-city, artist-promoter, or city-year (see discussion in Section 
2.2 and Figures 1-3).  Although, in principle, one could simultaneously introduce all the 
interaction terms in model (1), in practice, the flexibility of the specification comes at the 
cost of a reduction in degrees of freedom, so we report the results using different 
combinations of fixed effects. In Table 3, column 1, we introduce the interaction between 
artist and city. This captures differences in preferences for bands across cities. We also 
introduce the interaction of artist and year fixed effects to capture the possibility that the 
demand for a given artist changes over time, due to aging of the population or changes in 
the artist’s public.  In column 2, we include the interaction of city and year fixed effects, to 
account for the change in the number and preferences of fans within a city, as well as other 
time-varying city-specific characteristics.  In column 3, we include, in addition to artist-
year fixed effects, the interaction of artist and venue dummies: for each band, we allow 
heterogeneous consumers not only across cities, but also across venues within a city. In 
column 4, we further add city specific linear trends to capture the within-city change in 
preferences and demographic variables.
17  Finally, in column 5, we interact the artist and 
promoter indicator variables to capture the fact that pricing strategies are often jointly set 
by artists and promoters.  In spite of the wide variety of heterogeneity that is accounted for, 
the impact of price discrimination is systematically positive and statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  Price discrimination is associated with an increase in revenues 
between 4 and 6 percent. 
An important concern is that the adoption of price discrimination over time may be 
correlated with changes in demand characteristics.  For example, demand changes may 
increase the profitability of price discrimination.  But all our specifications control for year 
                                                            
17 At this point, adding city-year fixed effects reduces the degree of freedom too   21
fixed-effects.  In addition, column 1, 3, and 4 control for artist-year fixed effects, ruling out 
the possibility that the demand for different artists has changed at different points in time.  
Further, column 2 controls for city-year fixed effects, ruling out city heterogeneity in 
change in demand.  To conclude, endogenous adoption of price discrimination correlated 
with time is unlikely to be driving our results.  
 
4-3 Instrumental Variable Regression 
Tables 4-6 report the results of the IV specifications.  Our instrument Z varies 
significantly both across promoters and for the same promoter (summary statistics are 
provided in Table 4). The first stage results are reported in Table 6. In the first stage, our 
IVs are always significantly correlated with the use of price discrimination at a 1 percent 
confidence level, and we reject the null of weak IV (Stock and Yogo 2001). 
18,19 
The IV estimates in Table 5 vary between 6.8 and 9 percent. Overall, the magnitude of 
the impact of price discrimination is in line with previous results, although the standard 
errors significantly increase. In column 3, we use as IV the frequency of price 
discrimination for concerts organized by the same promoter in the same city, but for all 
years in the sample. The results are not significantly affected.  
 
4-4 The Determinants of Price Discrimination 
                                                                                                                                                                      
much. 
18 Table 6 reports the F-test of the significance of the excluded instrument in the first 
stage. The critical value for the Weak-IV test based on the first stage F-statistic is 
8.96. The null is that the instrument is weak, in the sense that the nominal 5 percent 
2SLS t-test of the hypothesis that price discrimination does not affect revenue has size 
potentially exceeding 15 percent (Stock and Yogo 2005).  
19 The weak-IV test fails when we use the specification in column 3 and add promoter 
fixed effects (results are not reported). The second stage coefficient for price 
discrimination, however, is still positive (and larger than in the other columns).    22
In Table 7, column 1 we report the estimated coefficients for γ3. Overall, the average 
treatment effect, [γ2 +Y*iγ3] where Y* includes the sample mean of the variables in Y, is 
not significantly different from the estimates in the previous sections. Our benchmark 
model is Table 2, column 3 (which includes artist, city and year fixed effects). Equation (3) 






l].  We 
investigate how observable characteristics are likely to influence this expression.
20   
 
Demand and Product Characteristics 
We select variables for which we can make a case to sign their interacted impact with 
price discrimination (impact on ln(R(PD=1))-ln(R(PD=0))) based on equation (3).  For the 
sake of brevity, we present only informal arguments, keeping in mind that formal 
comparative statics could be derived.     






l is higher in more 
heterogeneous markets.  Under that hypothesis, the return to price discrimination increases 
with market heterogeneity.  We consider three different measures of market heterogeneity 
which are computed using the Gini diversity index at city or place level using data from the 
2000 census.
21 (a) Occupational diversity: We compute the Gini diversity index using data 
on the proportion of the population in different occupational groups, as reported by the 
census (management, services, sales, farming, construction, production). A one percent 
increase in the diversity index implies a 0.5 percent increase in the return to price 
discrimination. (b) Income diversity.  The return to price discrimination is higher in cities 
in which income heterogeneity is higher, measured by the Gini diversity index using 16 
                                                            
20 We also include dummy variables for 11 months (February to December) in X and 
Y to control for possible seasonality in revenues and in the return to price 
discrimination. The inclusion of these further controls does not affect the results .    23
income brackets. Although the standard error is large and the coefficient is not 
significantly different from zero. (c) Ethnical heterogeneity.  Ethnical heterogeneity is 
measured by the Gini diversity index using three racial groups (white, black, other). The 
return to price discrimination is higher in cities with a more ethnically diverse population. 
This is consistent with diversity in preferences for quality being correlated with ethnic 
group heterogeneity. A one percent increase in the heterogeneity index implies a 0.06 
percent increase in the return to price discrimination. 
Income level: The level of average household income (by city or place) has a positive 
and statistically significant impact on the return to price discrimination. An increase in 
average household income of $10,000 implies a 3 percent increase in the return to price 
discrimination. This is consistent with equation (3) under the assumption that the income 







l increases faster than the denominator).   
Population Density (population per square mile, by city): The return to price 
discrimination is higher for concerts that take place in more densely populated areas.
22 One 
interpretation is that the diversity of public preferences is likely to increase with population 
density. In fact, larger and denser cities offer a larger and more differentiated set of 
consumer amenities (Glaeser et al., 2001).   
Venue Capacity: The proportion of high quality seats, nh/(nl+nh), decreases with the size 
of the venue because high quality seats are located nearest to the stage, in what is known as 
the golden circle. Beyond a given distance, all seats are close substitutes.  Once venue 
capacity reaches a certain level, a further increase in capacity mainly reflects an increase in 
the number of low quality seats, and the return to price discrimination should decrease with 
                                                                                                                                                                      
21 The Gini (1912) diversity index is equal to the probability that two random 
individuals belong to different groups. It is computed as G=1-Σi(fi)
2, where fi is the 
relative frequency of observations in group i.   24
the size of the venue.
23  The direct impact of venue capacity on revenues is positive.  A one 
percent increase in the number of available tickets implies a 0.97 percent increase in 
revenue. This is consistent with the results in the previous tables. In addition, however, 
capacity has a negative impact on the return to price discrimination as predicted by the 
theory.
24 A one percent increase in capacity implies a 6 percent decrease in the return to 
price discrimination.  
After consideration of the marginal effect of capacity alone, we now turn to the cross 
marginal effect between capacity and scaling (number of categories).  The return to 
additional seating categories (moving from 2 to 3 and 3 to 4) should increase with capacity.  
Stated differently, the larger the venue capacity the greater the return of adding a category.  
To test the hypothesis, we interact log(capacity) with a dummy variable for having 2, 3 or 
4 categories.  We hypothesize that the interaction coefficient should increase with the 
number of categories.  The results (not reported) are consistent with this hypothesis, and 
the difference between 2 and 4 categories is significant at 6 percent level.
 25 
 
Column 2 in Table 7 presents the result of a specification with a large number of 
additional interaction variables and demonstrates that the results discussed earlier are 
robust. We comment here only on the impact of competition which is of special interest to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
22 The size of the city has no significant impact on the return to price discrimination. 






l is independent of the size of the venue.   
24 In these regressions, capacity is the total number of tickets available in a given 
event. This variable could be greater than the venue size, because artists in 12 percent 
of the events offer multiple shows in the same city. We get similar results when we 
focus on the subsample of events with a single show. Similarly, when we split our 
capacity variable into one variable for venue size and another for number of shows 
(capacity is the product of these two variables), we get similar results for venue size 
as we did for capacity, and this is consistent with the theory (the coefficient estimate 
for number of shows is zero). 
25The joint test that the difference between the coefficients for 2-3 and 3-4 categories 
are different from zero is significant at 10 percent level.    25
economists.
26 The relationship between price discrimination and competition has received 
much attention in the theoretical literature, but there is relatively little empirical evidence 
available (Busse and Rysman, 2005).  Our contribution is to estimate how the return to 
price discrimination depends on competition.     
We measure competition by the number of concerts taking place in a given market in a 
given year.  Our measure of competition could be correlated with unobserved city 
characteristics, but we can control for such heterogeneity by including city fixed effects.  
Concert revenues are not significantly different on average in cities in which a larger 
number of concerts take place during the same year, regardless of whether price 
discrimination is used or not. The results do not change if we measure competition by 
musical genre. The same variable has a positive impact on the return to price 
                                                            
26 Equation (3) does not permit to sign the impact of all the variables in column 2 on 
the return to price discrimination. Nevertheless, some interesting stylized facts may 
fuel future research.  Age: The impact of age has an inverse U-shape with a peak in 
the late 30’s.  Band prominence: The impact of band prominence (measured by the 
number of words written in the biography of an artist on billboard.com) on price 
discrimination is positive and significant. Male ratio: The fraction of male members 
of the band has a negative impact on the return to price discrimination. One 
conjecture as to why is that male bands have more homogeneous audiences, which 
would imply more homogenous preferences over quality. Other product 
characteristics: the origin of the band (US or foreign), the genre (classified in three 
groups: rock, country and other) and the number of distinct artists featured, have no 
impact on the return to price discrimination. Interestingly, the number of artists 
featured has a direct positive impact on the level of revenues (independently of 
whether price discrimination is used): each additional band implies 3 percent higher 
revenues.  Increasing the number of artists increases the level of demand but does not 
increase the return to price discrimination. Number of concert in current year: An 
increase of 10 concerts per year implies a 3 percent increase in the return to price 
discrimination. Price differential: a $100 increase in the price differential between the 
highest and the lowest category implies a 7 percent increase in the return to price 
discrimination. Number of promoters: there is a positive impact  of the number of 
promoters on concert revenues. The number of promoters, however, is not associated 
with significantly higher returns to price discrimination. Seasonality and time trend:  
there is a significant increase in the overall level of revenues in November and 
December, but there is only weak within-year seasonality in the returns to price 
discrimination, with November and December having slightly higher returns. There is 
no evidence of any yearly trend in the return to price discrimination. This suggests   26
discrimination. On average, 10 more concerts implies a 2.6 percent increase in the return to 
price discrimination.  
The first result is difficult to reconcile with some models of price discrimination and 
competition (e.g., see Stole (2007) for a review) but is consistent with the possibility that 
concerts may be poor substitutes.   An interpretation for the second result is that when 
more concerts are being performed in a given city, more information may become 
available on how to optimally segment a venue, thus increasing the return to price 
discrimination.   
 
4-3 Return to Additional Seating Categories 
The number of seating categories is relatively low in the concert tour industry.  
Although Leslie (2007) reports the same observation in his study of a Broadway show (his 
firm never uses more than three seating categories for a given show), the number of seating 
categories can be quite large for classical music events (Huntington, 1993).  Assuming that 
the seller chooses the number of seating categories, one would expect to observe few 
seating categories if the return from adding categories is low. In fact, this is the view taken 
by Wilson (1996) and Miravete (2007) in the context of non-linear tariffs. They argue that 
the menus of tariff options offered in practice are simple because adding complexity 
beyond two or three tariff options has only a small impact on revenue, and arguably 
smaller than the associated marketing costs.   
While Miravete’s evidence applies to non-linear tariffs, there is no corresponding 
empirical study, to our knowledge, for a product line monopolist. This is despite the fact 
that many sellers forgo offering multiple product qualities (Anderson and Dana, 2008).  
Translated into the context of our case study, we would expect to find that the return to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
that the adoption of price discrimination was not due to a change in consumer   27
additional seating categories should be decreasing and small once a couple of categories 
are already offered.   
In Table 8, we report the average increase in revenues associated with using multiple 
seating categories. We include three indicator variables, equal to one when the number of 
seating categories is equal to two, three and four respectively (recall that only 4 percent of 
the concerts in our sample offer 4 seating categories). Table 8, Column 1 and 2 include the 
same control variables as in Table 2, column 3 and 4. Table 8, column 3 includes artist-
year and artist-city fixed effects as in Table 3, column 1. 
The marginal impact of one additional category is positive but decreasing as the number 
of existing categories increases. In column 1, the average increase in revenue associated 
with the introduction of the second seating category is 4.6 percent.  With the introduction 
of a third category, revenue further increases by 3.1 percent and with the fourth by only 
2.1.  Similar results hold for the alternative specifications, and the decline in the marginal 
increase in revenues is stronger for the fourth category.   
Although the return to price discrimination decreases with the number of seating 
categories, it is still the case that the return from adding a third and fourth category is 
significant (about half the return of introducing a second category).  This raises two 
questions:  (a) why do some artists still not price discriminate? (b) why do the majority of 
artists use only two price categories?
 27  The evidence suggests that artists leave money on 
the table, which is consistent with the observation that resale markets are to a large extent 
fueled by arbitrage opportunities due to un-priced quality differences within ticket 
categories (Leslie and Sorensen, 2008).  This is an interesting issue for future research. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
preferences.  
27 Interestingly, the option of using three categories peaked in the mid-90s and was 
not very common toward the end of our sample.    28
5-Summary 
This work is, to our knowledge, the first systematic non-structural study of the 
relationship between price discrimination and revenue at the level of an entire industry.  
We make two main contributions. First, we estimate the impact of price discrimination on 
revenue using a panel data and an instrumental variable approach. Second, we test 
comparative static predictions implied by the theory, on how exogenous markets 
characteristics should influence the return to price discrimination.   
We find that price discrimination increases revenue on average by 5 percent in our 
sample.  Interestingly, our baseline estimates are of the same order as Leslie’s (2004) 
results and this is despite the fact that we use a fundamentally different empirical approach, 
a different data set (a large fraction of the popular concert industry versus a single 
Broadway show), and that these two industries share few features beyond the fact that they 
both produce entertainment events. In addition, we find that the return to price 
discrimination increases in markets where demand is more heterogeneous, measured either 
by population density or demographic diversity. Finally, we find decreasing returns to 
additional seating categories.        29
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Figure 1. The frequency of price discrimination in the six cities with more than 300 












1990 1995 2000 20051990 1995 2000 20051990  1995  2000 2005
Atlanta Columbus Dallas 
Las Vegas  New York Philadelphia
Year  33
 
Figure 2. The frequency of price discrimination for the artists with more than 300 concerts 
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Figure 3. The frequency of price discrimination for the promoters with more than 350 
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Table 1. Summary statistics (21,120 concerts) 
Variable  mean  sd  p10  p25  p50  p75  p90 
Capacity utilization  .85  .19  .54  .72  .94  1  1 
Price Discrimination  0.75  0.43  0  1  1  1  1 
Attendance  13,005  13,965  3,271  6,162  10,016  14,939  22,736 
Revenue ($)  544,033  842,277  93,084  167,929  317,270  620,075  1,097,739 
Number of Prices  1.99  0.77  1  2  2  2  3 
Capacity  15,279  14,240  4,231  7,889  12,684  18,500  25,000 
Average Price  38.87  26.22  18.50  23.59  32.29  47.00  65.00 
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Table 2. The impact of price discrimination on concert revenue. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  ln(revenue)  ln(revenue)  ln(revenue)  ln(revenue)  ln(revenue) 
Price discrimination  0.58  0.24  0.052***  0.049***  0.053*** 
  (0.04)***  (0.03)***  (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
ln(capacity)    1.04  0.939***  0.806***  0.818*** 
    (0.02)***  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.019) 
Artist f.e.?      Yes     
City f.e.?      Yes     
Year f.e.?      Yes  Yes  Yes 
Tour f.e.?        Yes  Yes 
Venue f.e.?        Yes  Yes 
Promoter f.e.?          Yes 
N  21,120  21,120  21,120  19,540  19,540 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of gross concert revenues. Robust standard errors in 
parenthesis, clustered by city in columns 1-3, by venue in columns 4 and 5.. * significant at 10%; ** 




Table 3. The impact of price discrimination on concert revenue (with interaction terms). 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  ln(revenue)  ln(revenue)  ln(revenue)  ln(revenue)  ln(revenue) 
Price discrimination  0.040***  0.064***  0.050***  0.051***  0.048*** 
  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.008) 
ln(capacity)  0.734***  0.940***  0.698***  0.693***  0.906*** 
  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.005) 
Artist f.e.?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
City f.e.?  Yes  Yes      Yes 
Year f.e.?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Venue f.e.?      Yes  Yes   
Promoter f.e.?          Yes 
Artist-year f.e.?  Yes    Yes  Yes   
Artist-city f.e.?  Yes         
Artist-venue f.e.?      Yes  Yes   
City-year f.e.?    Yes       
Artist-promoter f.e.?          Yes 
City specific trend?        Yes   
Note: The dependent variable is the log of gross concert revenues. The number of observations is 
21,120.  Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by city in columns 1, 2, and 5, by venue in 
columns 3 and 4. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4. Summary statistics (Instrumental Variables) 
Variable  N  mean  sd  p10  p50  p90 
Freq. of PD in the same city and year  15,314  .795  .297  .333  .937  1 
Freq. of PD in the same city  18,894  .760  .276  .375  .857  1 
 
Differences from the mean (for a given promoter) 
Freq. of PD in the same city and year  15,314  0  .248  -.326  .059  .231 
Freq. of PD in the same city  18,894  0  .195  -.219  .026  .187 
Note: the first two rows report summary statistics for the frequency of price discrimination for other 
concerts organized by the main promoter in the same city and year or in the same city (for all years in 
the sample). The table also reports summary statistics for the deviations of the two variables from the 
promoter-specific means.  
 
Table 5. The impact of price discrimination on concert revenue (2SLS) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  ln(revenue)  ln(revenue)  ln(revenue) 
Price discrimination  0.090  0.068  0.074* 
  (0.055)  (0.120)  (0.041) 
ln(capacity)  0.937***  0.953***  0.942*** 
  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.006) 
Promoter f.e.?  No  Yes  No 
Artist f.e.?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
City f.e.?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year f.e.?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  15,314  15,314  18,894 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of gross concert revenues. The instrumental variable in 
columns 1-2 is the frequency of price discrimination for other concerts organized by the main promoter 
in the same city and year.  In columns 3, the IV is the frequency of price discrimination in other 
concerts by the main promoter in the same city (all years). Robust standard errors are in parentheses, 
clustered by city. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 6. First stage regression results (corresponding to the 2SLS results in Table 5) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Price discr  Price discr  Price discr 
Freq. of PD in the same city and year  0.241***  0.114***   
  (0.027)  (0.026)   
Freq. of PD in the same city      0.336*** 












Note: First stage regression results corresponding to the 2SLS results in Table 5. The dependent 
variable is equal to one if price discrimination was used, zero otherwise. The table only reports the 
coefficients for the frequency of price discrimination for other concerts organized by the same 
promoter in the same city and year (column 1 and 2), or in the same city for all years (column 3). The 
F-test is the test of the significance of the impact of the excluded instrument. The critical value for the 
Weak-IV test based on the first stage F-statistic is 8.96. The null is that the instrument is weak, in the 
sense that the nominal 5% 2SLS t-test of the hypothesis that price discrimination does not affect 
revenue has size potentially exceeding 15% (Stock and Yogo 2005). Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses, clustered by city. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   38
 
 
Table 7. The determinants of the return to price discrimination. 
  ln(revenue)  ln(revenue) 
Fixed effects     
Year f.e.?  Yes  Yes 
Month f.e.?  Yes  Yes 
Artist f.e.?  Yes  Yes 
City f.e.?  Yes  Yes 
Variables in Xi     
Ln (capacity)  0.975***  0.975*** 
  (0.021)  (0.022) 
Number of artists  0.017***  0.009 
  (0.005)  (0.014) 
Number of promoters  0.044***  0.039*** 
  (0.008)  (0.015) 
City competition    0.00040 
    (0.0013) 
Variables in Yi  
(interacted with indicator variable for price 
discrimination) 
   
   Demand:     
Ln(Gini occupational heterogeneity index)  0.487**  0.561*** 
  (0.204)  (0.186) 
Ln(Gini income heterogeneity index)  0.064  0.127 
  (1.185)  (1.007) 
Ln(Gini ethnical heterogeneity index)  0.063***  0.058** 
  (0.025)  (0.023) 
Average household income (/1,000)  0.003***  0.004*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Population density(/1,000)  0.009***  0.011*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004) 
City Population (/1,000,000)  0.023*  0.020 
  (0.014)  (0.015) 
   Product:     
Ln (capacity)  -0.064***  -0.081*** 
  (0.019)  (0.019) 
Age    0.055*** 
    (0.005) 
Age
2    -0.00075*** 
    (0.00007) 
Male ratio    -0.059* 
    (0.031) 
Prominence (words/1,000)    0.055*** 
    (0.009) 
US band    -0.015 
    (0.022) 
Genre 1 (Rock)    -0.020 
    (0.058) 
Genre2 (Country)    -0.040 
    (0.060) 
Number of artists    0.007 
    (0.013) 
Number of concerts in current year 
(importance of the artist) 
  0.0032*** 
    (0.0003) 
Price differential (Pmax-Pmin)    0.0007*** 
    (0.0001) 
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   Competition:     
City competition    0.0026** 
    (0.0013) 
   Distribution channel:     
Number of promoters    0.009 
    (0.017) 
   Seasonality and trend:     
Year trend    0.0026 
    (0.0031) 
Month f.e.?  Yes  Yes 
N  20,913  18,036 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of gross concert revenues. Robust standard errors are in 








Table 8. The return to the number of pricing categories.  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  ln(revenue)  ln(revenue)  ln(revenue) 
Two price categories  0.046***  0.047***  0.034*** 
  (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Three price categories  0.077***  0.067***  0.069*** 
  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Four price categories  0.098***  0.080***  0.070*** 
  (0.028)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
ln(capacity)  0.938***  0.806***  0.733*** 
  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.007) 
Artist f.e.?  Yes    Yes 
City f.e.?  Yes    Yes 
Year f.e.?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Tour f.e.?    Yes   
Venue f.e.?    Yes   
Artist-year f.e.?      Yes 
Artist-city f.e.?      Yes 
Observations  21,120  19,540  21,120 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of gross concert revenues. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 